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ARTICLES
ANATOMY OF STRATEGIC AFFILIATIONS - A
CORPORATION'S LIABILITIES FOR THE
ACTS OF ITS AFFILIATES
Daniel Leckrone, Esq.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Affiliations between business entities have occurred with increasing frequency during the seventies and eighties, and have come
to be relatively common transactions following relatively well understood structural patterns. While a variety of motives account for
the identity of the participants and the structures selected, they
nonetheless produce reasonably predictable outcomes in terms of
various business and legal issues ranging from market share to the
tax treatment of the consideration exchanged.
The affiliation is perceived to be "strategic" in current parlance
when it brings together individuals and organizations whose resources complement one another and will facilitate the achievement
of identified goals or objectives. This popular formula therefore
brings together entities whose planned business activities are perceived to have a tactical affinity or relationship which will generate
a synergistic or enhanced result - the "two plus two equals five"
effect.
There is however, a collateral effect which is often unanticipated by the business and legal executives involved in the planning
and execution of these transactions, and which tends to emerge on
the heels of some adversity. The less well understood and less predictable facet of these affiliations is that the more intrinsic good
*
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sense the affiliation makes, the greater the likelihood that classical
concepts of limited liability will be displaced by legal doctrines
which place responsibility for the acts of the participants on those
who are managing, controlling, or benefiting from the activities.
Fundamental to the recognition of this element of the relationship is the acceptance of a corresponding oversight or audit responsibility to assure that the participants share on an on-going basis
common perceptions of what constitutes acceptable conduct and acceptable risk, because they are in all likelihood sharing the resulting
exposure. The business and legal executives' fiduciary obligations
as well as the dictates of good management and good sense mandate
diligence in the scrutiny of the activities undertaken in pursuit of
the common objectives to assure that those activities are consistent
with the standards imposed within the executive's own company by
its own policies and procedures.
In exploring the pitfalls, our methodology will be to first briefly
review the basics of a corporation's legal responsibility. Second, to
identify the essence of a strategic affiliation. Third, to portray that
essence in the context of a fact pattern commonly encountered in
technology driven transactional environments. And lastly, the article will analyze the impact of that essence on the relationships between the entities in the context of four concepts or doctrines of law
not thought to be particularly unique to California jurisprudence.

II.

BASICS OF LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS

The California corporation exists by virtue of a grant of authority by the state intended to promote economic efficiency. The
fundamental elements of the corporation thought necessary to promote that economic efficiency are the potential for continuous existence, the limitation of the owners' liability for the acts of the entity
to their investment in the entity, the free transferability of the ownership interests in the entity, and the existence of an entity separate
from the natural persons involved.' The traditional economic rationale for this shift was the perception that the creditor is in a better economic position to evaluate and divert potential risk,2 that
intra-organizational efficiencies are created by the shift, and that an
1.

MARSH, MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATE LAW 1

§ 4.1

(1987) (hereinafter

MARSH). For a discussion on the legal fiction of the corporate person, see Schane, The Corporate Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TULANE L. REV. 563 (1987).
2. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1973) (hereinafter Posner). Posner reasons
that due to the creditors' market position, they are in a greater position to evaluate and defer
the risk of an organization.
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investment market is created by this shift.3
A corporation as an entity lacks the physical capacity to act for
itself and therefore can only act through others, either natural persons or other corporations acting in various capacities such as employee, officer, director, shareholder, or agent. The legal
responsibility of a corporation is, therefore, always based on the acts
of others. The nature of that responsibility depends on the nature
of the relationship between the corporation and the actor. The law
defines the relationship, in each case assigning to the actor the authority to act and to the corporation a corresponding responsibility
for the act.
In many jurisdictions, the legislative development of the concept of limited liability4 predated the corporate entity's right to own
an interest in another corporation.5 The underlying rationale for
limited liability for the equity investor is arguably not present when
that investor is a corporation and not a natural person.6

III.

THE ESSENCE OF A STRATEGIC AFFILIATION

A strategic affiliation is the coming together of individuals and
organizations whose resources complement one another and will facilitate the achievement of an identified business goal or objective.
While the financial resources of one or more of the entities is
usually relied upon for financing the undertaking, the essence of the
relationship is the existence of a tactical affinity between their re3. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52-U. CH. L.
REv. 89, 93-101 (1985); and Blumberg, Limited Liability and the Corporate Group, 11 J.
CORP. LAW 573, 612-16 (1986). Both of these articles set forth numerous factors that
demonstrate the desirability of business organizations to possess limited liability.
4. See Note, Should Shareholdersbe PersonallyLiable for the Torts of their Corporation, 76 YALE L. J. 1190 (1967) (quoting Nicholas Murrary Butler) "[Tihe limited liability
Corporation is the greatest single discovery of modem man."
5. California adopted a standard of limited liability for the shareholders of a corporate
entity in 1931. From 1849 to 1931, California held that the equity investors in a corporation
would share proportionally in the liabilities of the corporation. For a discussion of this historical background, see MARSH, supra note 1, ch. XV § 15.13, pp. 329-33. At the time of this
adoption, corporations were not in the position to be shareholders of other corporations, and
that limited liability would run to a corporate shareholder was not part of the understanding
which led to the adoption of limited liability. See BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW (hereinafter BLUMBERG 1) at pp. 56-62.
6. "The multiplicity of artificial personalities is far from the original concept of the
grant of power to create an artificial personality for business convenience." Berle, Jr., The
Theory of EnterpriseEntity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343, 344 (1947). See Halpern, Trebilock &
Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in CorporateLaw, 30 U. TORONTO L. J.
118 (1980); Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 271 (1984); and Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 89 (1985) (hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel).
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spective business resources and objectives, rather than merely the
existence of financial wherewithal. The existence and utilization of
these resources to pursue agreed upon objectives distinguishes the
relationship from that occupied by the parties in a mere financing
transaction customarily structured by banks or investors.7
IV.

COMMON FACT PATTERN IN TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN
TRANSACTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

A natural affinity exists between an entity which has developed
the ability to mass produce high quality precision products at low
cost, and an entity whose fundamental skills involve research and
development, product engineering, marketing, and sales. In recent
years, this affinity has tended to promote the following hypothetical
scenario in computer and other technology driven industries.
MFGCO is a billion dollar manufacturer able to mass produce
high quality, electronic products at low cost. MFGCO organized
INTERCO to identify and structure business activities which would
advance the interests of MFGCO. Mr. PROMOTER was appointed President of INTERCO and allowed to acquire a minority
interest in INTERCO which was subject to repurchase rights and
pledges in favor of MFGCO.
Two years ago, MFGCO agreed with Mr. PROMOTER to
provide several million dollars to fund a program to bring the leading edge Nubox product and manufacturing technology to
MFGCO. STARTCO was to be organized and managed by INTERCO to implement the Nubox program without disclosing the
involvement of MFGCO until necessary. Funds from MFGCO
were channeled through INTERCO to STARTCO through a series
of loan and guarantee transactions. Sixty percent of STARTCO
common stock was purchased by INTERCO for about five percent
of STARTCO's estimated capital requirements. The remaining
forty percent of STARTCO stock was made available for grant to
STARTCO founders and key managers, all of which was subject to
repurchase rights in favor of STARTCO and INTERCO.
STARTCO's remaining capital requirements were to be provided
by MFGCO in the form of debt.
INTERCO and MFGCO agreed that STARTCO would be
funded by INTERCO, and would hire Mr. ENGINEER as a
7. A comprehensive discussion of the liability exposure of the parties to a financing
transaction can be found at Marcellino and Kenfield, Due Diligence as a Two Edged Sword:
Potential Liability of Venture Capitalists Funding High-Tech Start-Up, 2 S. C. COMP. H.
TECH. L. J. 41 (1986).
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founder to assemble the personnel and vendors necessary to develop
a Nubox product very similar to the Nubox product recently introduced by TECHCO, and to acquire the necessary expertise and
technology needed to manufacture the Nubox product. The Nubox
product and manufacturing technology would then be transferred
to MFGCO for high volume manufacturing under agreements providing STARTCO with a continuing supply of Nubox products and
allocating marketing rights between MFGCO, INTERCO, and
STARTCO.
Representatives of both INTERCO and MFGCO knew that
Mr. ENGINEER was an ex-employee of TECHCO, that he had
been directly involved with the development of TECHCO's Nubox,
and that he had had access to TECHCO's Nubox drawings, design
information, technical data, vendor information, and trade secrets.
MFGCO and INTERCO took no action to assure that Mr. ENGINEER did not utilize TECHCO's proprietary properties in the design of the STARTCO product.
The companies became operationally and structurally entwined as the plan was pursued. Mr. PROMOTER, MFGCO executives, and a variety of other INTERCO and MFGCO agents and
employees were involved in and controlled all STARTCO decisions
of a traditional corporate or headquarters nature. Most directors
and officers of INTERCO and STARTCO, except for Mr. ENGINEER, were directors and/or officers of MFGCO or INTERCO.
STARTCO and INTERCO were not engaged in any activities other
than the Nubox plan, and were used to procure equipment and material for MFGCO and INTERCO as the plan progressed. The
companies often used the same law firms.
Careful review of the STARTCO business plan would reveal
that Mr. ENGINEER lacked the technical credentials necessary to
reverse engineer Nubox, and that STARTCO was not provided
with the time or the money to independently develop Nubox technology. However, over the ensuing months, drawings and prototypes for a Nubox emerged on time and vendors capable of
implementing sophisticated processes to produce precision parts
were readily identified.
Mr. ENGINEER had secretly taken copies of TECHCO's
Nubox drawings and data when he left TECHCO and was copying
the drawings and otherwise using the data in the development of
STARTCO's Nubox product. In so doing, he infringed the copyrights covering the drawings, and appropriated the trade secrets related to the materials and processes. The STARTCO Nubox

6

COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

product which emerged incorporated the wrongfully appropriated
TECHCO trade secrets and infringed the TECHCO patents issued
on the design, reflected in the copied drawings.
As STARTCO's Nubox product and manufacturing technology was developed, it was transferred and taught to MFGCO enabling MFGCO to learn the technology and manufacture the
Nubox product.
At some point in time, Mr. PROMOTER as the President of
INTERCO and MFGCO executives reasonably should have realized that the STARTCO Nubox resulted from the appropriation
and utilization of TECHCO proprietary property. When TECHCO
learned that its drawings had been used by Mr. ENGINEER, it so
advised STARTCO and MFGCO, but they made no effort to either
purge themselves of the materials or to procure a license from
TECHCO. STARTCO, INTERCO, and MFGCO continued to
transfer and utilize the technology, and attempted to conceal the
facts with denials and threats of expensive litigation.
V.

IMPACT ON THE AFFILIATES OF FOUR DOCTRINES

A.

The Doctrine of Principaland Agent

An agent is an entity which represents another entity in dealing
with a third party.' As a general rule in California, more is required for the creation of an agency relationship than a parent corporation's majority control of a subsidiary.9
At common law, the doctrine of agency relied upon the existence of a consensual relationship between the parties to constitute
them as principal and agent. In the absence of a consensual relationship, the courts required a high degree of control by a parent
over a subsidiary before an agency relationship could be inferred.
In the often repeated words of Justice Cardozo written in 1925
"[d]omination may be so complete, inference so obtrusive, that by
the general rule of agency the parent will be a principal and the
subsidiary an agent." 10 Consequently, at common law the doctrine
of agency was of little value in establishing inter-corporate liability.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (Deering 1987).
9. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 259, 274, 551 P.2d 847, 131
Cal. Rptr. 231 (1976); Walker v. Signal Cos., 84 Cal. App. 3d 982, 14 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1978);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M (1958). A corporation does not become an

agent of another corporation merely because a majority of its voting shares are held by the
other.
10. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 85, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1925) (Opinion by
Cardozo).
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However, California recognizes by statute two methods for the
creation of an agency relationship.11 A traditional consensual
agency relationship can be created by an express authorization to
act before the fact. A person or corporation is the "agent" of another person or corporation - called the "principal" - if he is
authorized to act for or in place of the other person or corporation.
The statute also provides that an agency relationship can be created
by a subsequent ratification, if a non-consensual relationship has
been expressly created. Therefore, conduct of an agent binds the
principal if the conduct is either (a) authorized, i.e., within the
scope of the agent's authority; or (b) ratified by the principal.
With respect to authorization, it is not necessary that conduct
be expressly authorized by the principal to bring it within the scope
of the agent's authority. Conduct is within the scope of his authority if it occurs while the agent is engaged in the duties which he was
assigned to perform and it relates to those duties. Also, conduct for
the benefit of the principal which is incidental, customary, or reasonably necessary for the performance of assigned duties is likewise
12
within the scope of the agent's authority.
The concept of ratification applies to conduct which was not
authorized at the time it occurred. The law provides that if at the
time of the conduct the agent lacks authority, the conduct may become binding upon the principal if the principal adopts and thus
gives effect to the conduct. The most common way for a principal
to ratify conduct is to voluntarily accept the benefits of the agent's
conduct.13 Once ratified by the principal, the prior conduct
of the
14
agent is treated as having been authorized in advance.
Generally the acceptence of benefits will constitute a ratification only if the principal had full knowledge of the facts at the time
of ratification.15 The courts will not require the full knowledge if
11. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2307 (Deering 1987). An agent may be created, and an authority may be conferred, by precedent authorization or a subsequent ratification.
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2330 (Deering 1987). An agent represents his principal for all
purposes within the scope of his actual or ostensible authority, and all rights and liabilities
which would accrue to the agent from the transactions within such limits, if they had been
entered into on his own account, accrue to the principal.
13. Agency relationships are always considered by the courts as oral and able to be
ratified by acceptance of the benefits therein with notice. Carrier v. Piggly Wiggly of S.F., 11
Cal. App. 2d 180, 182-83, 53 P.2d 400 (1936). See Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 3d 76, 500
P.2d 1401, 104 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1972); Sphan v. Guild Indus. Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 156, 156
Cal. Rptr. 375 (1979); Commonwealth Ins. Sys., Inc. v. Kersten, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1026,
115 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1974).
14. Supra note 11.
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2310 (Deering 1987). A ratification can be made only in the
manner that would have been sufficient to confer an original authority for the act ratified, or
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the lack thereof is due to the negligence of the principal. That is, if
the principal was ignorant of the facts because of his own failure to
investigate after the circumstances were such as to raise a question
and cause a reasonable person to inquire, the principal will be held
to have ratified the unauthorized conduct of the agent.16
Issues of knowledge and notice assume an additional dimension in the context of a corporate principal. The court must determine the point at which an entity lacking any intrinsic capacity to
know is deemed to have known. Corporations are, however, routinely chargeable with the conduct and knowledge of others.
The California Courts have broadly defined the scope of corporate knowledge. In Monteleone v. Southern California Vending
Corp., the court held that evidence demonstrating knowledge by officers and certain employees of the principal corporation was adequate to hold that the corporation17 possessed sufficient knowledge to
have ratified the agent's actions.
Another determination of corporate knowledge was made in
Northern Natl Gas of Omaha v. Superior Court.' This case involved an attempt to quash service of summons for want of jurisdiction.19 Mr. Larson was the president of both the parent and the
subsidiary corporations. The court held that based on the doctrine
of imputed knowledge, Mr. Larson was "chargeable of the statement, representations, acts, and conduct of the employees" of the
subsidiary regardless of any actual knowledge. 20 The court concluded that since Mr. Larson was also president of the parent corporation, the knowledge that was imputed to Mr. Larson as
president of the subsidiary would also be imputed to him as the
president of the parent corporation.2 '
What conclusions would a trier of fact be most likely to reach
when asked to apply the doctrine of principal and agent to the relawhere an oral authorization would suffice, by accepting the benefit of the act, with notice

thereof.
16. Reusche v California Pacific Title Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App.2d 731, 42 Cal. Rptr. 262
(1965). Ordinarily, the law requires that a principal be appraised of all of the facts surrounding a transaction before he will be held to have ratified the unauthorized act of the agent.
However, where ignorance of the facts arises from the principal's own failure to investigate
and the circumstances are such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry, [cites] he may be held
to have ratified despite lack of full knowledge.
17. Monteleone v. Southern California Vending Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 798, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 703 (1968).
18. Northern Nat'l Gas of Omaha v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. App. 3d 891, 134 Cal.

Rptr. 850 (1976).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 992.
21. Id.
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tionship between MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO in our pattern? That:
1. MFGCO was the principal responsible for the Nubox plan;
STARTCO and INTERCO were the agents of MFGCO in
the execution of the Nubox plan; the acts of Mr. ENGINEER, Mr. PROMOTER, and MFGCO executives in furtherance of the Nubox plan were the acts of their employers
and principals.
2. Arguably, Mr. ENGINEER's misappropriation and use was
"authorized" by MFGCO because the structure of the
Nubox plan made misappropriations and use of TECHCO
proprietary property incidental or reasonably necessary.
3. More significantly, however, the misappropriation and use
was certainly "ratified" by MFGCO because MFGCO failed
to prevent its agents INTERCO and STARTCO from continuing the appropriation and utilization of TECHCO proprietary property after MFGCO knew or should have known
what had occurred. MFGCO continued to accept the benefits of the Nubox plan.
4. Having ratified the misappropriation and use of TECHCO
proprietary properties by its agents INTERCO and
STARTCO, MFGCO has the same legal responsibility for
the acts of STARTCO and INTERCO as if MFGCO had
directed and authorized the acts in advance.
B.

The Joint Venture Doctrine

A joint venture is an undertaking by two or more entities
jointly to carry out a single enterprise for profit,2 2 and is characterized by the existence of the following elements:
1) a community of interests in the subject of the undertaking.
2) a sharing of profits and losses.
3) an "equal right" or a right in some measure to direct and
control the conduct of each other and of the enterprise.
4) a fiduciary relation between or among the parties.23
A joint venture does not require an express agreement between the
22. April Enter., Inc. v. KTrV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 819, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1983);
Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co., 49 Cal. 2d 501, 506-07, 316 P.2d 612 (1957); Spier
v. Lang, 4 Cal. 2d 711, 716, 53 P.2d 138 (1935). California does not recognize a distinction
between the doctrines ofjoint enterprise and joint venture. See Connor v. Great Western Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 863 note 4, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Boyd v.
White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 657, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); Ambrose v. Alioto, 65 Cal. App. 2d
362, 366, 150 P.2d 502 (1944); Larson v. Lewis-Simas-Jones Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 83, 89, 84
P.2d 296 (1938).
23. Stillwell v Trutanich, 178 Cal. App. 2d 614, 3 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1960).
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parties.2 4 The court will infer such an intention from the actions of
the participants in the venture, and once such an inference is drawn,

each member of the venture becomes liable for the actions of the
other.2 5
The requirements of participation and control are liberally de-

fined for joint venture arrangements, 26 and, for example, can be satisfied by an agreement between the parties that one will simply

invest funds, while the other maintains control over the operations.27 Further, the courts will not dispute the existence of a joint
venture for lack of community of interest simply because one party
has only contributed capital, another only property, and a third
only services.2 8

The lynch pin of the joint venture analysis is an intention to
jointly share in profits.29 California has broadly characterized such
arrangements as sufficient to constitute profit sharing for purposes
of finding a joint venture.30 The lack of an intention to share jointly

in losses will not negate the existence of a joint venture.31
The generally accepted definition of profit sharing distinguishes
between profits which are earned jointly and profits which are
earned severally. The profits in whatever form earned, however,
24. See Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 749-50, 177 P.2d 931 (1947); Rickless v.
Temple, 4 Cal. App. 3d 869, 892, 84 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1970); Singleton v. Fuller, 118 Cal. App.
2d 733, 740, 259 P.2d 687 (1953).
25. Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 749, 177 P.2d 931 (1947); Universal Sales
Corp. v. California Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 764-65 (1942); April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147
Cal. App. 3d 805, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1983); Rickless v. Temple, 4 Cal. App. 3d 869, 892, 84
Cal. Rptr. 826 (1970).
26. "The requirement of authority and control has been construed to mean that while
in the absence of a special agreement one joint venturer cannot bind the other, they may by
agreement grant authority to one or more of their number which would not be implied from
the relationship alone." Stillwell, supra note 23; Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 95-6,
212 P.2d 956 (1949); Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. App. 2d 435, 452, 261 P.2d 529 (1953).
27. See Oakley v. Rosen, 76 Cal. App. 2d 310, 173 P.2d 55 (1946).
28. See Kovack v. Reed, 49 Cal. 2d 166, 169, 315 P.2d 314 (1957); James v. Herbert,
149 Cal. App. 2d 741, 748, 309 P.2d 91 (1946).
29. 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (8th ed. 1974), Partnership, § 17, p.
4269.
30. "While in a technical joint venture there is usually a sharing of profits and losses in
the prosecution of the common enterprise, the mode of participating in the fruits may be left
to the agreement of the parties." Universal Sales Corp. v. California, 20 Cal. 2d 751, 764
(1942).
31. E. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIPS § 52.9, p. 476 (Ist ed. 1960), Joint Adventure. See also Lemming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 44 Cal. 2d 343, 282 P.2d 23 (1955);
Darity v. Driesal, 706 P.2d 995, 998-91 (1986); Stratford Group Ltd. v. Interstate Bakeries,
590 F. Supp. 859 (1984); Hellenic Lines v. Commodities Bagging & Shipping, 611 F. Supp.
665 (1985); Swann v. Ashton, 330 F.2d 995 (1964); Fedderson v. Goode, 112 Colo. 38, 145
P.2d 981 (1944).
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must be the joint property of the parties before division.32 Historically, the courts have narrowly defined the term profits. Recently,
courts have been more willing to consider an interest in the product jointly developed as evidence of profit sharing.33 Rawley provides a helpful explanation of joint profits.
Not every joint operation which results in benefit for the parties
constitutes a sharing of profits which characterize a joint adventure. The profits, in whatever form earned, must be the joint
property of the parties before division.3 4
The profits to be gained from the Nubox plan took a variety of
forms: the technology itself, the rights to use the technology to
manufacture the product, the rights to market the product and the
right to use the technology in the development and manufacturing
of future products, and the more traditional forms of pecuniary
profit which could be generated by the sale of these rights or by the
sale of products produced by the exercise and utilization of the
rights. As between MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO, the
rights had been allocated generally giving MFGCO the manufacturing rights and STARTCO and INTERCO the marketing rights.
With respect to the pecuniary profits, at least two opportunities
exist for allocation among MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO.
The first is a function of the transfer price agreed to between the
manufacturer and the re-seller. To the extent the transfer price exceeds the manufacturer's cost, profit appears on the operating statement of MFGCO as the manufacturer. To the extent the transfer
price is less than the resale price which the product commands in
the market place, profit will appear on the operating statement of
STARTCO and INTERCO as the marketers and re-sellers of the
Nubox. The agreement setting the transfer price is thus an agreement to allocate the aggregate gross profit representing the delta
between the manufacturing cost and the sales price to an affiliated
party. Although few courts have had occasion to deal with this subtle form of agreement to allocate profits in connection with a joint
venture analysis, a discussion can be found in a fairly recent federal
court decision.35
32. Darity v. Driesal, 706 P.2d 995, 998-91 (1986).
33. See Pros v Mid-America Computer Corp., 491 N.E.2d 851, 862 (Ill. App. 2d Dist.
1986). In this case the Illinois court states a willingness to consider the aquisition of title in a
software system as evidence of joint profits.
34. RAWLEY, supra note 32.
35. See Sasportes v M/V Sol De Copacabana, 581 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 1978). The
court agrees that in certain circumstances transfer price agreements could be sufficient for the
joint profits requirement.
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A second opportunity to allocate pecuniary profits among
MFGCO, INTERCO, and STARTCO as affiliated parties is in the
allocation of ownership interests in the entities on whose operating
statement the profit occurs. Without actually changing the ownership among the affiliated entities, the profits can also be allocated by
changing the rights and preference of the securities representing the
ownership.
There is thus an abundant basis for the instruction of a trier of
fact which would lead to the conclusion that MFGCO, INTERCO,
and STARTCO were joint venturers and as such, each are responsible for the acts of the others taken in the course of their pursuit of
the venture including, of course, the wrongful appropriation and
use of trade secrets by STARTCO and its employees.
C.

The Alter Ego Doctrine

Alter Ego is a judicially created equitable doctrine which disregards the corporate entity and extends liability to its shareholders36
when necessary to avoid an unfair result and do justice.3 7 The doctrine is based on a recognition of the corporate charter as a privilege
granted to the shareholders whose separation from the corporate
entity will be recognized unless justice demands otherwise."
The California courts have limited the application of the alter
ego doctrine to ". . . narrowly defined circumstances and only when
justice so require." 39 Traditionally the courts have only applied the
doctrine upon the showing of abuse, misuse, and fraud.4 0 Currently, other jurisdictions are beginning to show a willingness to
apply the doctrine ". . . in the absence of fraud or illegallity to prevent injustice and inequitable consequences."'" This notion of fairness is evident in the historical application of the alter ego
doctrine. 2
36. MARSH, supra n.1, ch. 15.
37. Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park Inc., 166 Cal. App. 2d 652, 654,
333 P.2d 802 (1958).
38. ". . . [C]ourts start with the premise that entity law controls and that entity law
exists to serve a fundamental principle underlying the corporate system - the principle of
'limited liability.' This leads to the corollary that the disregard of entity should be approached 'reluctantly' or 'cautiously' and should be undertaken only in 'exceptional' cases."
BLUMBERG I, p. 106.

39. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985).
40. McLoughlin v. L. Bloom Sons Co., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 854 (1962).
41. Messick v Moring, 514 So.2d 892, 894 (1987).
42. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985).
Citing LArTY the Court states: "The essence of the alter ego doctrine is that justice be done.
What the formula comes down to, once shorn of verbiage about control, instrumentality,
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While the doctrine has been applied to both corporate and natural person shareholders, scholars demonstrate that the courts have
shown a greater willingness to disregard the corporate entity when
43
the shareholder is a corporation rather than a natural person.
They attribute this willingness to an intellectual difficulty in extending limited liability beyond the corporate group.'
The alter ego doctrine is likewise applied with greater frequency when the injured party is an involuntary creditor.4 5 Here
again the courts tend to focus on "fairness." A voluntary creditor is
thought to be in a much better position to evaluate the risks of dealing with a particular entity, and equity therefore does not demand
the application of the doctrine with such frequency.46
The courts will look to numerous factors in determining alter
ego liability.47 The California Supreme Court, in the case of Minton
agency and corporate entity is that liablity is imposed to reach equitable results' (LATTY,
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS p. 191 (1936))."

43. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 110-11; Hachney & Bensen, Shareholder
Liabilityfor Inadequate Capital,43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 837, 873 (1982); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REv. 979, 992 (1971).
44. See supra note 7.
45. "An involuntary creditor who has had foisted upon him a subsidiary unable to
respond to the damages has a greater equity." Note, Liabilityof a Corporationfor the Acts of
a Subsidiaryor Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1130 (1958).
46. Douglas & Shanks, Isolation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,39
YALE L. J. 193 (1929).
47. In Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 806 (1962), the court set out the factors to be considered:
1. Commingling, diversion or manipulation of assets between parent and
subsidiary;
2. The treatment of the individual asset of the subsidiary as their own;
3. The subsidiary's failure to obtain authority to issue stock;
4. The holding out by the parent of their responsibility for the debt of the
subsidiary;
5. The failure to maintain or the commingling of the subsidiary's corporate
minutes or records;
6. Identical, equitable ownership of the two entities;
7. Substantially similar directors, officers, or management;
8. The use of the same business location;
9. Undercapitalization;
10. The use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit of a
single venture or the business of an individual or another coporation;
11. Misrepresentation or concealment of the responsible ownership;
12. The disregarding of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's
length relationships among related entities;
13. Intent to use the corporate entity as a shield from liability in the dealings
with a third party; and
14. The use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise
for another person or entity.
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v. Cavaney, described the process as follows: 48
The trier of fact must consider whether (1) such unity of interest
in ownership exists so as to dissolve the separate corporate personalities of the parent and the subsidiary, relegating the latter to
the status of merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of the former; (2) an equitable result will49occur if the conduct is treated as that of the subsidiary alone.
The unity of interest requirement does not mandate the complete
ownership of a subsidiary by a parent. The court is concerned with
the use of the control that generates inequitable conduct.5 0 In the
absence of any injustice involving the parent corporation, the court
will honor their separateness."1
Two factors consistently regarded as the most significant are
undercapitalization and economic integration. Undercapitalization
is the measure of both the degree and kind of capitalization made
available to the entity in relation to the risks and requirements generally associated with the business.5 2 The courts are concerned with
the reasonableness of the capital structure in comparison to the
norms of the industry."
The second factor assigned particular significance is economic
integration. 4 The emphasis is on interrelationship, either horizontally or vertically, of the corporate activity. Where the activites are
so complementary, the foundation is laid for piercing the corporate
veil. As indicated in the Connecticut case of Zaist v Olson:
If plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and
ownership that the independence of the corporation had in effect
48. 56 Cal. 2d 576, 365 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
49. Id. at 119.
50. Fidenas AG v. Honeywell, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1029 (1980); Washington Nat'l Corp.
v. Thomas, 494 Ariz. 2d 530, 570 P.2d 1269 (1977); Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335
P.2d 107 (1959); BLUMBERG I at p. 133.
51. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 301 (1985); McLoughlin v. L.
Bloom Sons Co., Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 854, 24 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1962).
52. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 985-89 (1971). For a
discussion on the calculations used in making the determination of the adequacy of capitalization, see BARBER, Piercing the Corporate Veil, CORPORATE PRACTICE COMMENTATOR
610, 633-39 (1981).
53. Automotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792 (1957).
54. For case law demonstrating economic integration as a factor in the corporate group
alter ego analysis, see Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302-3, 702 P.2d 601,
216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985); Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park Inc., 166 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 333 P.2d 802 (1958); Parker v. Bell Asbestos Mines Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397
(1985); Washington Nat'l Corp. v. Thomas, 494 Ariz. 2d 530, 570 P.2d 1268 (1977); Old
Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (1976). Some scholars conclude that economic
integration is the foundation of intergroup liability. See BLUMBERG I at p. 195.
55. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
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ceased, or had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate identity would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic entity to escape liability arising out of an
operation of
a corporation for the benefit of the whole
6
enterprise.1

Since the essence of a strategic affiliation is the existence and
utilization of complementary resources to pursue an identified business objective, the relationship is intrinsically economically integrated. The logic enunciated in Zaist, makes it apparent that the
better the economic fit, or the more strategic the affiliation, the
more likely it is that the separateness of the corporate entities will
be disregarded under the alter ego doctrine. The existence of economic integration alone, or even with other factors generally looked
to by the courts, will not automatically trigger the application of the
alter ego doctrine.5 7
Alter ego involves a facts and circumstances test, and the
courts are fundamentally result oriented in its application.5"
Although the traditional tests have focused on abuse, misuse, or
fraud, a strong argument can be made based on current case law
that the doctrine should be applied where equity so demands regardless of the presence of illegality. 9
The typical fact pattern includes extensive economic integration, undercapitalization, and intrusive control and intervention
into the subsidiary's operations. Separate corporate existence of
STARTCO would almost certainly be disregarded to render
MFGCO amenable to the claims of TECHCO and involuntary
creditors.
D. The EnterpriseDoctrine
Yet another basis for imposing liability on all participants in a
strategic affiliation for the acts of each participant taken in pursuit
of their common plan is the doctrine of enterprise liability. The
basis of the doctrine is the proposition that damages caused by an
economically integrated group pursuing an activity should be borne
by those with some logical relationship with the enterprise activity.6" The doctrine correlates the corporate legal fiction with eco56. Id. at p. 576. For a discussion, see Note, Piercingthe Corporate Veil in Connecticut,
5 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 109 (1983).
57. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
58. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d at 301 (1985).
59. Supra note 41.
60. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 COLO. L. REV. 153, 158
(1975).
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nomic reality by treating interrelated groups of corporations
pursuing a common economic motive as a single organizational
business unit.6 1
Professor Latty, in his 1936 work on subsidiary and affiliate
corporations, concludes that rather than attempting to fit the interrelated corporate group into a doctrine of "oneness" sought by alter
62
ego, the focus should be on the purpose for limited liability. If
that purpose is to protect the uninvolved shareholder (whether corporate or natural), it is fully served by permitting liability to spread
to other economically involved entities, but not to their respective
uninvolved shareholders. Proponents of the enterprise doctrine assert that extending limited liability throughout the corporate members of the integrated group is overprotection and economically
unjustifiable. 3
The United States Supreme Court recently added its endorsement to the recognition of the existence and significance of the enterprise. Applying the antitrust laws in the case of Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.," the Court held that a parent
and a wholly owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring with
one another to restrict trade because they are both participants in
61. See Berne, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (1947);
Stone, The Place of EnterpriseLiability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L. J. 1
(1980).
62. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS, p. 196 (1936).
"Once attention is focused on the denial of limited liability, rather than on
some mystical aspect of what a corporation is, entirely disconnected from the
pragmatic aspect of what it does, the significant difference between the corporate and individual stockholder suggests itself. The difference is not that the
parent corporation is a person 'created by law' while the individual stockholder
is a person 'created by the almighty,' or that the parent hath no soul or that it
is an intangible, invisible essence into which there can be merged another intangible, invisible essence so as to create a conceptional oneness more easily
than in the case of an individual stockholder. The difference is simply that the
parent corporation has already achieved limited liability, or rather, its' stockholders have; in other words, in allowing recovery against the parent, there is
no denial of limited liability so long as the recovery does not go back to the
parent to reach its stockholders and subject them to unlimited liability. But if
in allowing recovery against the parent, there is no complete denial of limited
liability, there is very obviously a limitation of that accepted principle. This
limitation is achieved by recognizing in law what is an economic fact in nearly
all of the parent-subsidiary cases reported, viz., that the parent with all of its
subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries constitutes a single economic unit."
63. BLUMBERG I at p. 99. "Limited liability has unthinkably been carried beyond the
original objective of insulating the ultimate investor for debts of the enterprise, so that the
doctrine now enables a corporate group to insulate each corporate tier of the group and thus
achieve layers of insolation for the parent corporation from the liability from the obligations
of numerous subsidiaries."
64. 467 U.S. 753, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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the same enterprise. The Court considered the economic reality as
opposed to the legal formality65 and concluded that just as the business enterprise should be free to select the structure method of its
operations, the Court should be likewise free to deal with the reality
of those structures. 6
In Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assoc. 67 the court
found that defendant Great Western was part of an economically
integrated corporate group that built, sold, and financed a particular real estate venture and was liable to purchasers of structurally
defective homes. In applying the guidelines of Biakanja v. Irving,6 8
the court held that Great Western owed a duty to insure the integrity of the property sold. Great Western's failure to check the land
resulted in the breach of their duty, and they were subsequently
found liable for the harm caused the injured homeowners.6 9
Although the direct holding of Connor 70 as applied to financial
institutions has been subsequently overruled by legislative action71
the case indicates the court's support for the applicability of an enterprise approach to intragroup liability. Further support is found
in two subsequent cases applying intragroup responsibility for the
actions of individual member entities involving insurance 72 and
products liability.73
Once again the question is, will the trier of fact examine the
relationship of the parties and their respective responsibility for one
another's acts? And once again the inquiry has revealed that the
character and purpose of the relationships between the parties to a
strategic affiliation provide yet another basis in the law for each participant being held accountable for the acts of each of the other
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at pp. 772-74.
69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
Biankja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). The court looked to:
1. The extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff;
2. The foreseeability of harm to plaintiff;
3. The degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury;
4. The closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered;
5. The moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; and
6. The policy of preventing future harm. (HARTWVELL, Suits Against Business
Entities: Substantive Issues, in ADVANCED TRIAL PRACTICE SERIES; Suits

Against Business Entities: Secondary Target, p. 7 (1986).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (Deering 1987).
72. See Delos v. Farmer's Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979).
73. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
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participants. Under the enterprise theory, the traditional limitations on liability which would ordinarily insulate the shareholder/
parent from the implications of the acts of its corporate subsidiary
are set aside because the two have become participants in the pursuit of a common enterprise. Under the enterprise doctrine, the collective resources of the participants which were available to the
enterprise will be made available to TECHCO as an involuntary
creditor seeking compensation for the misappropriation and infringement of its proprietary properties by STARTCO in its pursuit
of the enterprise plans.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Taking considerable literary license, the involuntary creditor
whose claims arose out of acts of the debtor in connection with a
business plan agreed to among the debtor and other entities bringing complementary resources to the table, can in all likelihood be
heard to say: "How do I love thee? Let me count the ways. 74 I love
thee as an agent, as a joint venturer, as an alter ego, and as an
enterpriser."
The pitfall of the strategic affiliation is a lesser understood and
less predictable facet of this type of relationship. That is, the more
intrinsic good sense the affiliation makes, the greater the likelihood
that classical concepts of limited liability will be displaced by legal
doctrines which place responsibility for the acts of the participants
on those who are managing, controlling, or benefiting from the
activities.
Fundamental to the recognition of this element of the strategic
affiliation is the acceptance of a corresponding oversight or audit
responsibility. This would assure that the participants share, on a
continuous basis, common perceptions of what constitutes acceptable conduct and acceptable risk. This is necessary because they are
in all likelihood sharing the resulting exposure. The business and
legal executives' fiduciary obligations as well as the dictates of good
management and good sense mandate diligence in the scrutiny of
the activities undertaken in pursuit of the common objectives to assure that those activities are consistent with the standards imposed
within the executive's own company by its own policies and
procedures.

74. From: ELIZABETH BARRETr
XLIII, ed. W. Peterson (Barre; 1977).
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